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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between a woman’s intrahousehold bargaining position and 
her welfare within marriage.  Simultaneity problems common to the literature are overcome by 
using dowry to proxy for bargaining position.  Omitted variable bias is addressed by using grain 
shocks in the year preceding marriage and sibling sex composition as instruments for dowry.  
Instrumented dowry positively impacts several measures of a wife’s welfare, including time 
allocation, household purchases, and the wife’s decision-making authority, thereby offering 
strong evidence to support collective models of the household. 
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The predominant model of household behavior formalized by Becker (1991) assumes that 
families maximize a single utility function, i.e., that either all household members have identical 
preferences or that one household member functions as a dictator, determining all allocations 
within the household.  While this “unitary” model has provided important insights into 
household behavior, it offers little perspective on how individual preferences inform these 
allocations.  More general models of the household that explicitly account for differences in 
preferences have resulted.  One prominent set of models treats household decisions as the result 
of household members engaging in cooperative Nash bargaining (Manser and Brown, 1980; 
McElroy and Horney, 1981).
1  In such “collective” approaches to household behavior, the 
bargaining position of household members plays an important role in determining resource 
allocations within the household. 
  While the concept of intrahousehold bargaining is theoretically straightforward, 
measuring bargaining position is difficult in practice; there is a paucity of socioeconomic data 
that include both plausible measures of household bargaining and individual welfare measures, 
and it has proven difficult to convincingly correct for endogeneity problems with existing data 
(Behrman, 1997).  Nevertheless, numerous studies have been undertaken which find evidence 
supporting the collective models of households in many developing countries. 
  Due perhaps to intuitive appeal and empirical tractability, many studies focus on 
assignable income as relative measures of intrahousehold bargaining position, e.g., Folbre 
(1984), Von Braun (1988), Garcia (1990), and Hoddinott and Haddad (1995).  They find grounds 
to reject the income pooling hypothesis central to the unitary model and find considerable 
evidence that control of resources has strong implications for how those resources are used by 
the household.  However, by using income as a regressor, they unrealistically assume that labor 
supply decisions are exogenous.  To avoid this simultaneity problem, other studies rely on 
nonlabor income to measure relative bargaining power, e.g., Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990).  
This strategy is also problematic, however, because nonlabor income may depend on individuals 
being in a particular state, e.g., receiving benefits due to temporary illness, and because 
persistent unobservable differences in productivity and taste may have influenced past asset 
accumulation (Behrman, 1997).  Furthermore, nonlabor income may reflect previous labor 
                                                           
1 A more general model assumes only that household members allocate resources in a Pareto efficient manner 
(Chiappori, 1988; Chiappori, 1992).   2
supply decisions and may thus be endogenous across the lifespan (Strauss and Thomas, 1995; 
Hoddinott, Alderman, and Haddad,1997; Schultz, 2001).
2  An appealing alternative to income as 
an indicator of bargaining position are sex ratios at the relevant marriage ages, laws governing 
divorce, and other environmental factors that may shift threat points within marriage (Rao and 
Greene, 1993; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales, 1997; Ward-Batts, 2001; Chiappori, Fortin, and 
Lacroix, 2002; Anderson, 2003).  In principle, variation in such parameters can be used to 
identify how changing threat points affect household allocations.  However, in the absence of 
randomized experiments, these factors may also be endogenous (Hoddinott et al., 1997).   
  In the search for exogenous determinants of intrahousehold bargaining position, one 
interesting recent approach has stressed the importance of assets controlled by individuals at the 
time of household formation.  If such assets remain under control of the original holder, they 
may affect the relative bargaining positions in the household (and thus marital allocations) 
without the simultaneity concerns that arise in the previously described studies.  Hence, Thomas, 
Contreras, and Frankenberg (1997) and Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) find evidence that 
women’s share of the assets brought to marriage by the spouses influences children’s health 
and/or education outcomes in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and South Africa.  While 
concerns about simultaneity diminish when using pre-marital assets as a proxy for bargaining 
position, the possibility of omitted variable bias remains.  Zhang and Chan (1999) thus 
implement a two-stage estimation strategy in which parental education is used as an instrument 
for dowry when estimating the effect of pre-marital endowments on the probability that husbands 
do household chores in Taiwan.  However, unobservable characteristics of the wife, e.g., 
intelligence, may be correlated with both parental education and household bargaining outcomes, 
and the instrument may thus not be exogenous in the second stage.  Further, they do not control 
for cohort differences, resulting in biased estimates if younger husbands both have more 
educated parents and contribute more time to housework.  Their identification strategy is thus 
subject to endogeneity problems similar to those in many previous studies of household 
behavior.   
  This paper makes use of detailed new data from China to investigate the effect of dowry 
on household allocation in a cooperative Nash bargaining framework.  To control for the 
                                                           
2 Nevertheless, Schultz (2001) points out that there is a dearth of studies that systematically establish simultaneity 
bias between nonlabor income and household outcomes.     3
potential endogeneity of marital payments, I use two types of instruments.  The first is regional 
grain yield shocks in the year preceding marriage.  The surveyed households are located in rural 
areas where livelihoods have long depended on farming.  Unanticipated shocks to grain yield in 
the period just before marriage are therefore likely to have a substantial impact on household 
wealth accumulation, and thus on the ability of households to make transfers associated with 
marriage.  The second type of instrument is the sibling sex composition of the bride and groom.  
Sibling sex composition likely affects the savings available for marital payments given the high 
costs associated with marrying sons versus the expected income from marrying daughters and 
the fact that credit markets are not well developed.  These instruments influence payments made 
before marriage while remaining plausibly exogenous to household allocation decisions after 
marriage.  In contrast to many other studies, I also include family background measures to better 
control for unobservable characteristics of the couple that may correlate with marital payments.  
In addition, estimates include marriage cohort dummies to account for the possibilities that the 
amount of marital payments reflect generational norms and that factors affecting intrahousehold 
decisions may vary by cohort.  Finally, I use village fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  This identification strategy represents a significant improvement over previous 
studies in controlling effectively for potential bias from omitted variables and simultaneity.   
  I analyze the effect of dowry on a variety of household allocation decisions of interest to 
the wife, including her total leisure time, the time that her husband allocates to household chores, 
and the probability that the wife self-identifies as being satisfied with her life.  To help 
distinguish between wealth effects and bargaining effects, I also analyze the impact of dowry on 
household spending on women’s goods as a share of total expenditures, on the wife’s share of 
the couple’s total leisure time, on her husband’s share of the couple’s total time devoted to 
chores, and on the degree to which the wife has the authority to make decisions when the 
husband and wife disagree about household matters.  I find that dowry has a positive and robust 
effect on each of these outcomes, providing strong evidence that pre-marital endowments affect 
household bargaining, and thus household consumption choices. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the collective Nash 
bargaining model; section 3 describes the role of marital payments in the marriage ritual in 
China; section 4 details the identification strategy used in the empirical investigation; section 5   4
introduces the data used in the analysis; section 3 presents empirical evidence that dowry affects 
a wife’s bargaining position; and section 7 concludes. 
2. Cooperative Nash Bargaining Model 
  Following McElroy and Horney (1981), consider two unmarried individuals, w and h, 
who each care about their own consumption of goods and leisure.  Individual i’s utility in the 
single state is given by  ) (
i i
s
i
s X U U = , where  } , { h w i∈ , which is assumed to be nondecreasing 
and quasiconcave.  Here,  } , {
i i i l x X ∈ , 
i x is i’s consumption of goods, and 
i l represents i’s 
leisure.  Suppose that w has a private endowment given by D.  In the single state, w maximizes 
utility by choosing 
w X  subject to the constraint given by  D T r l r px
w w w w w + = +  and h 
maximizes utility by choosing 
h X  subject to 
h h h h h T r l r px = + .  Here, p is the price of
i x , 
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i's wage rate, and 
i T  is the total time available to i.  This yields the strictly quasiconvex indirect 
utility functions  ) , , , (
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h h h T r p V , with the indirect utility of individual w 
increasing in the endowment, D.  That is,  0 / > dD dV
w .  The indirect utilities outside of 
marriage correspond to the threat points of individuals within marriage (i.e., the minimum utility 
available to each individual in the event of marital dissolution),
3 and thus to their relative 
intrahousehold bargaining positions.   
  In the cooperative Nash bargaining framework, w and h jointly choose consumption to 
maximize the gains from marriage over their own and their spouse’s consumption: 
 
(1)         [ ][ ] ) , , ( ) , (   ) , , , ( ) , (
h h h h w h
m
w w w h w w
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subject to the joint budget constraint equating total household expenditure to total household 
income: 
 
(2)   D T r T r l r l r px px
h h w w h h w w h w + + ≤ + + +   
 
                                                           
3 Lundberg and Pollack (1993) have shown that that the central predictions of the collective models of household 
behavior hold even when divorce is precluded in that couples may revert a noncooperative Nash equilibrium within 
marriage, i.e., the “separate spheres” solution.   5
which is assumed to be binding.
4  In the context of marriage, D may be interpreted as dowry, and 
it is assumed that D reverts to w in case of divorce.   
By the implicit function theorem, the solution to the household’s problem is a system of 
demand equations for goods and leisure: 
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The total effect of a change in dowry on the optimal allocation of x and l may be decomposed 
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Holding the total budget constant, an increase in the relative bargaining position of one 
spouse must lower that of the other spouse.  Thus, the net effect of a change in dowry has an 
ambiguous impact on h’s consumption because the wealth and bargaining effects associated with 
dowry offset each other, i.e.,  0 / >< dD dX
h , assuming that each individual’s consumption is a 
normal household good.  However, the wealth and bargaining effects are both positive for w, i.e., 
0 / > dD dX
w .  As such, it is important to distinguish between bargaining and wealth effects 
before concluding that dowry shifts bargaining positions within marriage.   
3. Marital Transactions in Rural China 
  Multiple transfers between the natal families characterize the marriage ritual in China.  
Brideprice (pinli or pinjin) is a transfer or series of transfers from the groom’s parents to the 
bride’s parents, while dowry (jiazhuang) represents a subsequent transfer from the bride’s family 
                                                           
4 The solution to this game is characterized by Pareto optimality in the allocation of resources, invariance with 
respect to linear transformations of each player’s utility function, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.  
Manser and Brown (1980) discuss these implications.   6
to the bride.  Thatcher (1991) documents this system dating to the Spring and Autumn period of 
the Eastern Chou dynasty (770 - 256 B.C.), and it persisted through the first half of the 20
th 
century.  However, the Chinese government sought to combat “feudal” practices in marriage 
with the founding of the People’s Republic of China.  Central to this objective was enacting the 
1950 Marriage Law that specifically prohibited “the exaction of money or gifts in connection 
with marriage” (Meijer, 1971).  Yet as Parish and Whyte (1978) put it, “Poor peasants were less 
enthusiastic about marriage struggle than they were about class struggle,” and the new rules were 
largely ignored (Ocko, 1991; Min and Eades, 1995), particularly in rural areas. 
  In rural China, brideprice is negotiated between the two natal families, typically using a 
matchmaker as intermediary.
5  Because the bride formally leaves her own family at marriage to 
join her husband’s, the brideprice negotiation focuses on how the bride’s family should be 
compensated for investments made in rearing the bride (Croll, 1981) and the loss of rights over 
her (Goody, 1973).  A further consideration, particularly after agricultural decollectivization 
when families could again profit from the sale of excess production, is the loss of a bride’s future 
productivity (Parish and Whyte, 1978; Min and Eades, 1995; Zhang, 2000).  That is, brideprice is 
a mechanism for clearing the market,
6 but not generally for making bequests to the husband or to 
the conjugal unit directly.  A marriage date is also fixed at the time of betrothal, with 
engagement typically lasting one year (Liu, 2000).  Brideprice is usually given to the bride’s 
family in several installments over the course of the engagement.
7 
  After brideprice is received, the bride’s family decides the size and composition of the 
dowry; unlike brideprice, it is not subject to negotiation by the groom’s parents.  Offering 
elaborate dowries provides a vehicle for prestige building (Potter and Potter, 1990; Siu, 1993; 
Liu, 2000) and serves as an efficient pre-mortem inheritance (Parish and Whyte, 1978; Croll, 
                                                           
5 Marriages that are arranged by the bride and groom themselves are increasingly common throughout China 
(Cheng, 1992).  Interestingly, brideprice and dowry are paid even in the majority of these marriages (Parish and 
Whyte, 1978). 
6 It may be surprising that brideprice serves as the market clearing mechanism (as opposed to an analogous transfer 
from the bride’s family to the groom’s) because population growth and sex differences in age of marriage imply that 
the number of women exceeds the number of men in each marriage cohort (Rao, 1993 investigates a similar 
phenomenon in India).  Possible explanations are that the benefits of marriage accrue disproportionately to 
husbands, that divorced men remarry while divorced women do not, or that there is greater male vis-à-vis female 
heterogeneity (Edlund, 1996).  This puzzle remains an issue for further investigation in China. 
7 An alternative practice sometimes observed is the “exchange marriage” in which a sister of the groom marries a 
brother of the bride in lieu of formal brideprice.  These marriages also tend to have lower dowries (Selden, 1993).   7
1981).  The difference in timing of inheritance for sons and daughters may be attributed to higher 
transaction costs for daughters who have married and left the household, and in many cases the 
local area.  In much of rural China, current practice is that brides’ parents retain part of the 
brideprice and pay out part as dowry.  Dowry today typically includes bedding, clothing, 
furniture, and possibly other durables such as a bicycle, sewing machine, radio, and television 
(Siu, 1993; Liu, 2000).  It also includes a significant cash component for the bride’s exclusive 
use.  Dowry thus forms the basis of the new conjugal unit’s household.  While the groom has 
equal access to the non-pecuniary aspects of dowry, the bride retains ultimate authority in its use 
(Zhang, 2000).  For example, Yan (1996) describes brides using their dowries to make high-
interest loans to in-laws who must pay brideprice in the marriage of a younger son.   
Prior to 1981, divorce was legally difficult to obtain and the divorce rate was accordingly 
low.  The 1981 Marriage Law considerably eased the requirements for divorce, however, and the 
rates have risen steadily since.  In 1998, there were 0.954 divorces per 1000 population (Wang, 
2001),
8 with the highest rates occurring in rural interior provinces (Zeng and Wu, 2000).    
Furthermore, the 1981 Marriage Law stipulates that dowry reverts to the bride in the event of 
marital dissolution (Ocko, 1991).  Divorce is therefore a realistic outside option for wives in the 
surveyed areas. 
  Given that brideprice is an intergenerational transfer from the groom’s parents to the 
bride’s parents and that dowry is an intergenerational pre-mortem bequest made by the bride’s 
parents to the bride, it is expected that dowry affects bargaining position within marriage, while 
brideprice has no effect, as Zhang and Chan (1999) find in Taiwan.  In what follows, I 
nevertheless test whether brideprice also affects marital allocations by including it as an 
additional regressor. 
4. Empirical Specification and Identification 
  The wife’s share of marital resources, 
w X , resulting from the cooperative Nash 
bargaining process may be written as follows:  
 
(5)   1 3 1 2 1 1 e B D X
w + + + + = β β β α Z  
                                                           
8 For comparative purposes, the equivalent rate in the U.S. was 4.2 divorces per 1000 population in 1998 (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999).   8
 
where D is the dowry a wife brings to marriage, B is the brideprice payment made to the bride’s 
parents, and  1 Z is a vector of demographic and explanatory variables including differences in the 
husband and wife’s age and education levels, the number of children and adults (other than the 
husband and wife) in the household, household wealth, characteristics of the natal families, and 
marriage cohort and village dummies.  Age differences (defined as the husband’s age less the 
wife’s) and education differences (defined analogously) may affect marital threat points.  
Household demographics may affect the distribution of household chores and the opportunity to 
engage in work outside the home.  Household wealth (defined as the current value of household 
durables) may influence consumption choices.  Characteristics of the natal household are 
included to control for unobserved characteristics of the conjugal couple that might correlate 
with marital payments.  Marriage cohort dummies are included to control for generational 
differences in marital norms and the factors affecting intrahousehold decisions.  These dummies 
were chosen to capture observed variation over time in both marital payments and household 
allocations, and vary by county.  In addition, a set of cohort or village dummies are included to 
control for sex ratios, unemployment rates, and unobserved heterogeneity at the local level.
9  If 
dowry affects the wife’s consumption of goods or leisure, then  1 β  will be positive. 
  Dowry and brideprice are unlikely to be exogenous in equation (5) because any 
unobserved characteristic of the wife that affects these payments may also affect her share of 
marital output.  For example, Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) show that physical attractiveness 
affects marital allocations, and it is plausible that it might also affect the size of the dowry 
transfer.  Alternatively, women with very likable personalities may receive higher dowries from 
their parents and have better marital allocations than women with disagreeable personalities.  In 
either case, estimating equation (5) using ordinary least squares (OLS) would produce biased and 
inconsistent estimates.  Identification of equation (5) therefore requires instruments that are 
excludable from  1 Z .  Dowry and brideprice may thus be estimated by: 
 
(6)    
3 2 2 1 3
2 3 2 2 1 2
e B
e B D
+ + + =
+ + + + =
ω ω α
δ δ δ α
Z Z
Z Z
1
1  
                                                           
9 Ideally, dummies for the bride’s and groom’s home villages would both be used, but the former are not available in 
this survey.  Still, marriages typically occur between households in neighboring villages or towns, and only rarely 
across long distances.  Therefore, conditions in the two natal villages are likely to be similar.   9
 
where  2 Z  is a vector of instrumental variables that explain D and B but which is independent of 
w X . 
  With incomplete credit markets in China’s rural areas (Jalan and Ravallion, 1999), 
household savings are the primary source for marital payments.  As a result, the instruments 
employed in this analysis each reflect savings available at the time of marriage.  The first 
instrument is a measure of regional grain yield shocks – specifically, the deviation from trend in 
provincial per capita grain yield in the year immediately preceding marriage.  Grain yield is a 
particularly important determinant of income (and thus savings) in rural western China where 
virtually all families are engaged in grain production, and this was even truer for the parents of 
the surveyed couples.  The deviations from trend are the residuals from regressing historical per 
capita grain yield data in each province on a linear spline of harvest year; this identification 
strategy isolates the effect of transitory output shocks that are independent of time trends in the 
level of economic development in each locality.  Because marriage typically occurs in the year 
following betrothal negotiations (Liu, 2000), grain shocks are lagged one year.  The timing of 
marriage may be endogenously determined because families may seek to postpone entering 
marital negotiations until after a good harvest, especially in the absence of complete credit 
markets.  The willingness to wait for a good harvest may nevertheless be tempered by cultural 
preferences for children marrying at certain ages.  In any event, the groom’s family is unlikely to 
permit delays to the wedding once a couple is betrothed and the wedding date has been fixed.
10  I 
find that negative regional grain shocks have a small negative influence on the number of 
marriages in the following year, but that the relationship is not significant (output omitted), 
suggesting that current wealth is not an overriding concern in deciding when to begin marriage 
negotiations. 
  The second instrument is the sibling sex composition of the bride and groom.  Because 
brideprice exceeds dowry in most areas, the marriage of a daughter represents net household 
income while that of a son represents net household expenditures.  Moreover, because these 
transfers tend to be substantial, the sex composition of children in the household is an important 
determinant of the lifetime wealth profile of Chinese families.  Note that for this identification 
                                                           
10 The groom’s family is expected to give elaborate and expensive gifts to the bride’s family during the length of the 
engagement, and a postponement increases the family’s expenses (Yan, 1996).  In addition, the bride will contribute 
to the groom’s family’s income, so there is an opportunity cost associated with delaying marriage.   10
strategy to be successful, sibling sex composition cannot correlate with important unobservable 
characteristics of the individual.  To that end, other family background factors such as parental 
education and the total number of siblings are included as additional controls.
11 
  Given that the sex composition of children in the household is known, parents may 
anticipate future cash flows and adjust savings in order to smooth consumption over the lifetime.  
However, if preferences are time-inconsistent, i.e., if the household discount rate is hyperbolic 
(Angeletos, 2001; Harris and Laibson, 2001), then the sex composition of older children may 
play a larger role in determining dowry and brideprice than the sex composition of younger 
children given that Chinese children tend to marry in birth order.  If, on the other hand, parents 
value future consumption more than current consumption, the sex composition of younger 
siblings may be more important.  Finally, a prominent thought in the sociology and anthropology 
literatures is that while the sex composition of the groom’s older siblings is a primary 
determinant of the size of the brideprice (Parish and Whyte, 1978; Siu, 1993), the sex 
composition of the bride’s younger siblings is an overriding determinant of the size of the dowry 
(Min and Eades, 1985); this scenario is plausible because the brideprice payment is made before 
the dowry payment and because the former is typically larger than the latter, and suggests that 
rural Chinese parents may have difficulty smoothing consumption via savings.   
  Tables 1A and 1B present first-stage estimates for the determinants of dowry and 
brideprice, respectively, adjusted to 1985 prices.  Column 1 presents the determinants of dowry 
and brideprice including exogenous shocks to grain yield as well as the sex composition of all 
siblings (suggesting time-consistent preferences with savings), column 2 substitutes the sex 
composition of older siblings (suggesting hyperbolic discounting), column 3 substitutes the sex 
composition of younger siblings (suggesting patience), and column 4 presents the determinants 
of marital payments when the groom’s older siblings affect brideprice and the bride’s younger 
siblings affect dowry (the scenario described in the sociology and anthropology literatures).  
Concurring with the observations of many social scientists conducting fieldwork in rural China, 
F-tests for the joint significance of the instruments show that the sex composition of the groom’s 
older siblings and the bride’s younger siblings are indeed strong determinants of marital 
                                                           
11 If unobservables remain important after controlling for family characteristics, they might affect outcomes such as 
education in the same way that they affect marital allocation.  I thus regressed the wife’s education on family 
characteristics, birth year, province dummies, and sibling sex composition.  I find that sibling sex composition does 
not have a significant effect on a wife’s education.   11
payments, and these are the instrumental variables used in the analysis that follows.
12  Using 
Bassman’s (1960) test, overidentification is rejected.  These instruments are therefore used in the 
two-stage estimations that follow. 
  There are several concerns about the identification strategy that are worth noting.  First, 
wealth may be simultaneously determined with household allocation.  However, the only 
appropriate instrument available is the family’s holding of high-quality flat (i.e., non-sloping and 
non-terraced) land – the preferred land for agricultural production.  This instrument is plausibly 
exogenous from household decisions about the wife’s consumption of goods, 
w x , but not leisure, 
w l , because a household’s land holding is correlated with the time used to farm it.  Wealth is 
therefore excluded from the empirical specifications wherein time is the outcome of interest.  For 
completeness, I nevertheless included wealth as an additional regressor in these empirical 
specifications.  I found that the point estimate for wealth is not significant and the other 
coefficients are not significantly different when it is included (output omitted). 
  Another concern is whether the effect of dowry persists after years of marriage.  On the 
one hand, the cash component is likely to have been spent and the value of durables will have 
depreciated after a number of years, suggesting that dowry becomes less important.  On the other 
hand, norms established early in the marriage may persist, so the effect of dowry on household 
allocations may endure.  Indeed, I find that the estimated effect of dowry on certain aspects of a 
wife’s welfare (such as her free time and the time that her husband allocates to household chores) 
is not significantly different for couples married for more than 10 years versus those married 
fewer than 10 years (output omitted).  This finding suggests that the effects of dowry persist well 
into marriage.
13  
                                                           
12 I tried a variety of other instruments as well, including parent occupational status, historical data on land affected 
by natural disaster, and historical local grain yield data.  However, none of these measures explains as much 
variation in dowry or brideprice as regional grain yield shocks and the sibling sex composition of the bride and 
groom.  There is low variation in parent occupation, with only 1.7 percent of households not having at least one 
farmer.  Historical natural disaster data has strong predictive power, but is unavailable for 1967-1977.  Like disaster 
data, local grain yield is unavailable for several years; moreover, this variable has surprisingly little predictive power 
even when it is available.  Indeed, even including these variables as additional instruments lowers the adjusted R
2 in 
the first stage.  A related issue is that wealthier households may be able to smooth consumption and thus be better 
insulated against income shocks (Foster, 1995 provides evidence for Bangladesh).  In my sample, however, 
interacting the instruments with parent characteristics such as education and occupation provides no additional 
explanatory power.  
13 Future work will extend the analysis to account for dynamic bargaining models of the household such as that 
described by Lich-Tyler, 2001.   12
It should also be noted that it is possible that dowry correlates with some other 
characteristic of the bride such as her social network, and that this trait is the true determinant of 
her marital bargaining position.  To address this particular concern, I included measures of the 
bride’s social network (e.g., whether family benefactors are related to the husband or wife and 
which families were visited during important holidays) as additional regressors in the empirical 
work that follows.  I found that including these regressors had no discernable impact on the 
dowry coefficients (output omitted).
14   
  A more general concern is whether the relationship between dowry and a wife’s 
consumption works through her bargaining position rather than through a wealth effect.  I thus 
analyze the effect of dowry on the wife’s share of the couple’s time allocation, on the household 
spending on assignable goods, and on the wife’s decision-making authority when the husband 
and wife disagree.  Differences in these outcomes stemming from differences in dowry suggest 
changes in the relative bargaining positions of the spouses, a story that is inconsistent with pure 
wealth effects (assuming, in the case of an individual’s share of the couple’s total leisure time, 
that any wealth effect is gender neutral).
15  While the evidence I present suggests that dowry 
operates through a bargaining effect, I nevertheless cannot rule out other models that generate 
similar comparative statics. 
5. Data and Variables 
  The second wave of the China Rural Poverty Survey, a collaborative effort of researchers 
from the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science’s Institute of Agricultural Economics and the 
University of Michigan (including the author), was conducted in February 2001.  The survey 
covered four officially designated poor counties, with one county in each of four interior 
provinces: Gansu, Guizhou, Shaanxi, and Sichuan.
16  The survey encompassed 587 households 
evenly distributed across 40 villages.  Approximately two-thirds of the households also 
                                                           
14 The relative strength of the wife’s social network was associated with each measure of wife’s welfare, but never 
significantly so.  Exploring this issue may be of interest for further study. 
15 If however, the wealth effect is not gender neutral, then wealth effects and bargaining effects are indistinguishable 
when looking at the shares of leisure accruing to each spouse.  It is also possible that wife’s leisure is a luxury good 
desired by both spouses.  If so, then the wealth effect and bargaining effect may again be indistinguishable.   
16 The sampled county in Guizhou is a designated minority county with sizable Miao and Yi populations, but 80 
percent of the sampled households in Guizhou are ethnic Han Chinese, making it difficult to distinguish differences 
between minority and non-minority households.     13
participated in the first wave of the survey, conducted in December 1997.
17  Excluding 
households in which the head is widowed, divorced, single, or absent reduces the sample to 460.  
I restrict the sample further by dropping 5 households that have key variables missing and 4 
households in which marriage preceded the 1950 Marriage Law.  The final sample thus consists 
of 451 couples married between 1950 and 2000, inclusive. 
  Respondents were asked detailed information about their marriages, including the values 
of dowry and brideprice.
18  Detailed demographic and time allocation data were collected for all 
members of the household.  Additionally, household expenditures on a range of goods were 
collected.  Last, a separate instrument designed to assess attitudes, preferences, marital roles, and 
decision-making authority was asked of husbands and wives separately.   
  In this study, a wife’s welfare within marriage is measured in the following ways: 
1.  the wife’s total leisure (non-work) time; 
2.  the total time that husbands allocate to household chores; 
3.  the share of annual household accruing to women’s goods;  
4.  the wife’s self-reported satisfaction; and 
5.  the wife’s decision-making authority 
Again, dowry may have a wealth effect, a bargaining effect, or both.  Spending on women’s 
goods and the wife’s decision-making authority help to distinguish between these effects.  To 
further distinguish between wealth and bargaining effects, I also analyze the impact of dowry on 
the wife’s share of the couple’s total leisure time and on the husband’s share of the couple’s time 
devoted to chores; if wealth effects are gender neutral (admittedly, a strong assumption), then 
they cannot explain changes in the share of leisure time accruing to one of the partners. 
  These measures may require some explanation.  Leisure time is defined as the time spent 
outside of market work, farm work, and household chores; although it excludes the wife’s time 
allocated to gathering wood, cooking meals, cleaning, and several other chores, it may include 
unmeasured household activities such as time spent rearing children, sleeping, or not working 
                                                           
17 Park and Ren (2001) and Brown and Park (2002) describe the first wave of the China Rural Poverty Survey. 
18 Detailed records of marital transactions are generally kept as part of the public record.  When questioned, few 
respondents had difficulty recalling the exact amounts of their brideprice and dowry – or that of their siblings, 
children, or neighbors.  Marital prices were converted to real values using 1985 as the base year.  For marriages 
occurring prior to 1985, prices were converted using the general retail price index, which was first calculated in 
1950.  For marriages occurring after the mid-1980s, prices were converted using the rural consumer price index, a 
more accurate reflection of rural prices that was introduced in 1985.   14
because of illness.  This measure therefore represents a wife’s total potential leisure time (see 
Schultz, 2001 for discussion).  Husbands’ time allocated to chores is defined as the hours spent 
cooking, cleaning, and gathering firewood in an average week.  To proxy for spending on 
women’s goods, I use a category of spending called “ge ren yongpin zhichu” (expenditures on 
items of personal use), of which makeup, jewelry, and razors were given as examples.  Because 
razors are inexpensive and durable, and thus likely contribute little to the total annual 
expenditure (unlike jewelry which is expensive or makeup which is consumed quickly), I 
attribute this consumption to the wife.
19  This variable is measured as a share of total household 
spending.  A wife’s satisfaction is measured by the extent to which she agrees with the following 
statement, “Overall, I am satisfied with my life.”  This may be of interest because it may reflect 
welfare beyond the other outcomes evaluated here.  It is reported as a categorical variable with 
values 1 (“completely unsatisfied”), 2 (“somewhat unsatisfied”), 3 (“somewhat satisfied”), and 4 
(“completely satisfied”).
20  Because few wives reported being either “completely unsatisfied” or 
“completely satisfied,” the analysis will investigate only whether women report being satisfied or 
unsatisfied; this bivariate measure has the advantage of allowing IV probit estimation with 
corrected standard errors.  Finally, the wife’s decision-making authority is an index variable for 
which a value of 0 is assigned if the husband is responsible, 1 is assigned if the wife is 
responsible, and 0.5 is assigned if they are jointly responsible.  Unlike decision-making authority 
which may simply reflect household specialization strategies (Thomas et al., 1997), this outcome 
measures the wife’s empowerment to make decisions when there is a household dispute, a 
measure that is likely influenced by bargaining position directly.  This question was asked 
separately of husbands and wives.  In the few cases wherein the spouses disagreed, the wife’s 
assessment is used in the analysis. 
  Basic indicators for the 451 sample households are presented in Table 2.  On average, 
women spend 5 hours per day engaged in income-generating activities and household upkeep, 
leaving 19 hours per day for other activities, including leisure, sleeping, rearing children, and 
                                                           
19 This interpretation is clearly problematic if many male goods are included in this expenditure category, but the 
results detailed below are difficult to explain if this is the case.  In addition, similar (but slightly weaker) results are 
obtained when using the share of expenditures spent on children’s clothing as the outcome variable of interest.  This 
result is consistent with higher female bargaining power resulting in improved conditions for children, a common 
finding in the household bargaining literature, e.g., Thomas (1990). 
20 Importantly, data on the wife’s satisfaction were collected when husbands and members of his natal family were 
not present.   15
other activities.  The distribution of leisure between husband and wife is roughly equal in the 
mean household, with women spending 4.0 percent less time in leisure than their husbands.
21  
Husbands spend 44 minutes per week cooking meals, cleaning, and gathering wood on average, 
although roughly half of the surveyed husbands do none of this work.  The time that husbands 
spend helping with household chores amounts to 17.7 percent of the total time that couples 
devote to these activities, but 8.6 percent of husbands perform at least half of these chores.  
Spending on women’s goods accounts for 0.2 percent of annual household spending on average, 
but this figure varies widely.  Surveyed households commonly spend nothing on this form of 
consumption, while one percent of households spent 2 percent or more of their total expenditures 
on women’s goods.  Women were split nearly evenly between feeling satisfied and feeling 
unsatisfied with their lives.  The majority of women reported feeling either “somewhat satisfied” 
or “somewhat unsatisfied,” with only 13 women at either extreme.  Finally, wives have sole 
decision-making authority when disputes arise in 27.0 percent of households, and shared 
responsibility in a further 16.0 percent of the surveyed households. 
  Turning to the independent variables, the average couple has been married for 19.4 years.  
The typical husband is 43 years old, 3 years older than his wife, and has completed primary 
schooling, 3 grades more than his wife.  Households include 1.4 children and 0.6 other adults 
(typically an elderly parent) on average.  Using 1985 as the base year, the real average household 
wealth as measured by the value of major durables was 655.9 yuan.  Total parental education 
averages 2.4 years and husbands and wives have 3.8 and 2.7 siblings in their natal families, 
respectively.
22   
  The mean real brideprice was 538 yuan (in 1985 yuan) and the mean real dowry was 247 
yuan, suggesting that the bride’s family retains 54 percent of the brideprice received on average.  
Practice varies widely by province, however.  In Gansu, dowry averages just 22 percent of 
brideprice, while average dowry exceeds brideprice by 18 percent in Sichuan (Figures 3.1A and 
                                                           
21 Again, this measure excludes child rearing.  The wife’s share of leisure time may be misleading if wives spend 
more time caring for children than their husbands. 
22 Average family size in these areas fell considerably after the One Child Policy was adopted formally in 1979.   16
3.1B).  Further, dowry and brideprice have been appreciating at 3.8 percent and 4.6 in real terms, 
respectively, since 1950.
23  The simple correlation between real dowry and brideprice is 0.43.   
6. Empirical Results 
  This section analyzes the effect of dowry on the wife’s total leisure (non-work) time, the 
husband’s time allocated to performing household chores, and the degree to which wives self-
identify as being satisfied with their lives.  To help distinguish between wealth and bargaining 
effects, I also analyze the effect of dowry on the amount of money spent on women’s goods as a 
share of annual household spending, on the wife’s share of the couple’s total leisure time and on 
the husband’s share of the couple’s total time allocated to household chores, and on the wife’s 
decision-making authority when the spouses disagree about household issues.  Per the discussion 
in section 3.4, I estimate the following fixed effects model for the effect of dowry on the wife’s 
allocation, 
w
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where D is the dowry she received at marriage, B is the brideprice her parents received when she 
was betrothed, A is the age difference between the husband and wife, E is the difference in their 
education, 
k N  is the number of children in the household, 
a N  is the number of other adults in 
the household, W is the household’s wealth, F is a vector of natal family characteristics, and 
cm λ  
is a county - marriage cohort interaction term.   
  Table 3 shows the OLS, probit, and ordered probit estimates for several measures of the 
wife’s allocation.  Household wealth is omitted to save space, but including wealth does not 
appreciably change the signs or magnitudes of the other coefficients (output omitted).  Column 1 
presents OLS estimates for the wife’s total leisure time, column 2 presents those for the 
husband’s total time allocated to household chores, column 3 shows OLS estimates for women’s 
                                                           
23 Regressing dowry on marriage year yields highly significant, positive coefficients in each province.  Regressing 
brideprice on marriage year produces highly significant, positive coefficients for Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu.  The 
effect in Guizhou is positive but not significant.   17
goods as a share of household expenditures, column 4 presents the marginal effects for the 
probability that wives reports being satisfied (as opposed to unsatisfied) with their lives, and 
column 5 presents the marginal effects for the probability that women have some or full 
autonomy in making decisions when the husband and wife disagree about household issues using 
ordered probit estimation.  The “shares” measures of husband and wife’s time allocations are 
omitted to save space.  County-marriage year interactions are included in order to control for 
time and location trends in marriage payments and household responsibilities.  Also, village 
fixed effects are included in the first three estimates to control for unobserved heterogeneity at 
the local level.  Because some survey forms were asked on a subsequent visit to the household 
during which some respondents were unavailable, there are fewer observations for the attitudinal 
outcomes.  As a result of the smaller sample size and the fact that there exists no variation in 
these outcomes within some villages, county fixed effects supplant village fixed effects in 
estimating the determinants of these measures.
24  
  With the exception of a husband’s time allocated to household chores, dowry has a 
positive effect on a woman’s welfare within marriage.  Except for influencing a woman’s 
decision-making authority, these effects are also significant.  Dowry has a modest effect on a 
woman’s leisure (non-work) time, with a 100 yuan increase (40 percent of the mean real dowry) 
increasing non-work time by 0.5 percent of the mean.  The effect of dowry on the share of the 
household budget accruing to women’s goods is more pronounced, with a 100 yuan increase in 
dowry corresponding to the mean budget share increasing by 12.6 percent.  Similarly, higher 
dowry is associated with higher self-reported levels of satisfaction, with a 100 yuan increase in 
dowry at the mean resulting in an 8.9 percent higher probability of feeling satisfied.  Again, the 
marginal effect of dowry on decision-making authority is not significant.   
  The estimated effects of brideprice are considerably smaller than those of dowry (except 
in determining the husband’s time allocated to chores, although neither of these point estimates 
is significant) and are largely insignificant, consistent with the theory that brideprice should not 
affect marital welfare except via its effect on dowry.  Brideprice has a significant, negative 
impact on household spending accruing to women’s goods, suggesting perhaps that families that 
                                                           
24 The difference in the sample size reported in columns 4 and 5 is attributable to the fact that there is no variation in 
wife’s decision-making authority among the households in one marriage cohort in one county.   18
pay higher brideprice negotiate lower consumption for the bride, but the magnitude is less than 
one-third that of dowry.   
  Other regressors enter largely as expected.  When the difference in ages between husband 
and wife are greater, the wife’s leisure time declines.  Simple cross-tabulations suggest that 
relatively young wives do more manual labor, such as cleaning and gathering firewood (output 
omitted).  Similarly, as the husband - wife education gap increases, the likelihood that the wife is 
less satisfied increases.  The presence of other adults raises both a wife’s satisfaction and the 
share of the household spending accruing to women’s goods, which is sensible if these other 
adults are women.  The wife’s total number of siblings positively affects the time that husbands 
allocate to chores, perhaps because such women are used to sharing responsibility for household 
activities, while the husband’s parents’ education and his total number of siblings increase a 
wife’s decision-making authority, perhaps because such men have more progressive attitudes or 
are used to sharing authority.  Finally, the wife’s parents’ education has a positive effect on the 
time that husbands allocate to chores for reasons are not immediately clear. 
  As discussed above, dowry and brideprice may reflect unobserved characteristics of the 
bride and groom, and hence these estimates may be biased.  For example, Boulier and 
Rosenzweig (1984) have shown that physical attractiveness affects allocations within marriage, 
and it is plausible that it might similarly impact the size of marital transfers.  Similarly, a bride 
with a pleasant personality may receive a higher transfer from her parents and may also be 
treated well within her marriage.  These unobserved positive characteristics of the bride will bias 
the estimated coefficients on dowry upward.  By contrast, higher dowries may also result from 
unobservable negative characteristics of the groom and/or his family.  That is, the bride’s family 
may attempt to insure against poor treatment of their daughter in her conjugal home by 
influencing her intrahousehold bargaining position via a larger dowry.  In such cases, the 
estimated coefficients on dowry are biased downward.
25  Because the direction of the bias caused 
by omitted variables is ambiguous, whether dowry and brideprice have true effects on household 
allocations remains questionable. 
  Following the procedure described by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), I test for the 
exogeneity of dowry and brideprice.  Using the residuals from regressing dowry and brideprice 
                                                           
25 It has been pointed out that negative aspects of the bride may also prompt a larger dowry in some cultures, but 
this may be less likely in the Chinese context because dowry is assignable and exclusive to the bride.   19
on all of the exogenous variables in equations (5) and (6) as additional regressors when 
estimating equation (5), I test the hypothesis that the coefficients of the residuals are jointly zero.  
I find that the joint exogeneity of dowry and brideprice is rejected at the 99 percent confidence 
level (output omitted).  Therefore, OLS is an inconsistent estimator and estimation using a two-
stage approach is warranted. 
  Dowry and brideprice are instrumented using regional grain shocks in the year preceding 
marriage and the sibling sex composition of the bride and groom, as detailed in section 4.  
Because wealth may be simultaneous with household allocation decisions, I estimate the 
determinants of spending on women’s goods, the wife’s satisfaction, and the wife’s decision-
making authority when household disputes arise with and without controlling for wealth.  When 
including wealth as an additional regressor, the household’s allocation of high-quality, flat land 
is used as an instrument.  However, I lack a satisfactory instrument when the outcome of interest 
is related to time allocation, so wealth is excluded in these regressions.  As noted above, 
including un-instrumented wealth in these regressions nevertheless has no impact on the other 
estimated coefficients (output omitted). 
  Table 4 presents two-stage least squares estimates for the determinants of the wife’s 
potential leisure time, defined as time spent outside of wage work, farm work, work in private 
business, and household chores.  Column 1 presents estimates for leisure time in hours per day 
and column 2 presents estimates for the wife’s share of the couple’s total leisure time.  
Increasing dowry by 100 yuan increases the wife’s potential leisure time by 44.4 minutes per 
day, or 3.9 percent of the mean.  This effect is considerably larger than the OLS estimate 
presented in Table 3, suggesting that dowry correlates with unobserved negative characteristics 
of the groom more strongly than unobserved positive characteristics of the bride, per the above 
discussion.  An alternative explanation is that dowry may be measured with considerable error.  
Given the cultural significance of this transfer, the fact that survey respondents rarely had 
difficulty recalling exact values, and the extent to which marital transactions are recorded in the 
public record, however, I find this explanation unlikely. 
  As noted in section 2, dowry may have a wealth effect, a bargaining effect, or both on the 
wife’s potential leisure time.  If there is only a wealth effect and if the wealth effect is gender 
neutral, the distribution of the couple’s total leisure time should be unaffected by changes in 
dowry.  However, dowry is associated with an increase in the percent of the couple’s total leisure   20
time accruing to the wife, with her share of leisure time increasing by 0.8 percentage points for a 
100 yuan increase in dowry.  Moreover, dowry has no discernable effect on a husband’s total 
leisure time in separate regressions (output omitted), suggesting that a bargaining effect may 
offset a wealth effect associated with dowry.  Controlling for dowry, brideprice has a weakly 
negative impact on a wife’s leisure time, although the effect is not significant at the 0.10 level.   
  The determinants of the time that husbands allocate to cooking meals, cleaning, and 
gathering wood in an average week are presented in Table 5, both as a level (column 1) and as a 
share of the total time that the couple devotes to these activities (column 2).  For every additional 
100 yuan of dowry, husbands increase their time allocated to chores by 28.6 minutes on average, 
an increase of 64.4 percent.  This finding is robust to the time spent on other household chores as 
well (output omitted).  If dowry operates through a wealth effect alone, the time that husbands 
devote to household chores should fall; this finding to the contrary suggests that a bargaining 
effect overrides the wealth effect.  Again, the magnitude of the effect is larger than that estimated 
using OLS, suggesting that the bride’s family uses dowry as a means of insuring against 
unobserved negative characteristics of the groom and/or his family.  Dowry also impacts the time 
share of household chores performed by husbands,
26 with a 100 yuan increase in dowry resulting 
in an 11.2 percentage point increase in the share of household chores performed by men.  This 
finding is also consistent with the notion that dowry has a bargaining effect, assuming again that 
wealth effects are gender neutral.  Larger age gaps are associated with the husband doing a 
greater share of the household chores, as is the size of the wife’s natal family.   
  The determinants of women’s goods as a share of household expenditures are presented 
in Table 6.  Two specifications are estimated, the first excluding wealth (column 1), the second 
including it (column 2).  The coefficient for instrumented wealth is not significant, and including 
this measure does not dramatically alter the point estimates for dowry or brideprice.  Increasing 
dowry by 100 yuan corresponds to increasing the expenditure share of women’s goods by 0.08 
percentage points, or 45.6 percent of the average expenditure.  Moreover, regressing the share of 
                                                           
26 Men are reported as doing all of these chores in 5 percent of the sampled households.  One explanation is that 
husbands do all of the household chores when wives are chronically sick.  Health information including the 
frequency and duration of sickness is available for two-thirds of these households.  In this subsample, the wife self-
reported no sickness in the previous year in 47 percent of households.  Only one woman reported being sick for 
more than a month, and none reported being sick for more than 5 weeks.  An alternative hypothesis is that men 
specialize in performing these chores in some households.  Dropping these households from the sample reduces the 
point estimate by 23 percent and the effect remains significant.   21
household spending allocated to alcohol and tobacco (goods consumed exclusively by men in the 
survey areas) on dowry and brideprice does not yield significant estimates (output omitted).  
These findings provide further evidence that dowry works through a bargaining effect.  
Additionally, having more adults in the household is associated with higher spending on 
women’s goods, presumably because some of the additional adults are women.  As before, the 
magnitudes of the point estimates are smaller than those estimated using OLS.   
  Table 7 shows the marginal effects of the determinants of women’s satisfaction using IV 
probit estimation.  Standard errors are corrected following the procedure described in Maddala 
(1983) and Newey (1987).  As noted above, there are fewer observations for the attitudinal 
outcomes, and limited variation in some villages renders including village fixed effects 
impossible.  Thus, county fixed effects replace village fixed effects in the remaining estimations.  
Column 1 presents estimates when wealth is excluded from the specification and column 2 
presents those when wealth is included.  The point estimates for dowry are 22.9 percent lower 
when wealth is included, providing evidence that the wealth effect is important.  Still, the 
coefficient is positive and significant even when controlling for wealth, again suggesting that 
there is a bargaining effect at play.  As dowry increases by 100 yuan, women are 12 to 16 
percent more likely to report being satisfied with their lives.  Women report higher satisfaction 
when there are other adults in the home, but neither brideprice nor the other regressors has a 
discernable effect on wife’s satisfaction.  Once again, the point estimates are larger than those 
obtained from OLS estimation, supporting the notion that dowry compensates for negative 
characteristics of the groom and/or his family. 
  Wife’s decision-making authority is an index variable that describes whether women 
have no authority, complete authority, or joint authority with their husbands to make decisions 
when spouses disagree about household matters.  Joint decision-making authority occurs in 16.0 
percent of households and may be an important reflection of bargaining power.  Estimates from 
the two-stage ordered probit model are thus shown in Table 8, columns 1 and 2.  Because the 
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix has not been derived for this model, however, the 
standard errors have not been corrected and the z statistics that are shown are unreliable.  Point 
estimates nevertheless suggest that a wife’s dowry has a strong influence on her decision-making 
authority, and that this finding is robust to the inclusion of household wealth, again suggesting   22
that dowry operates through a bargaining effect.  The estimated effect of brideprice is negative, 
as above, and much smaller than that of dowry.   
  Aggregating wives who have no decision-making authority with those who have joint 
decision-making authority permits estimation of an IV probit model with corrected standard 
errors (Maddala, 1983; Newey, 1987), shown in columns 3 and 4.  Again, dowry has a positive 
and significant impact on a wife’s decision-making authority.  Controlling for household wealth 
reduces the point estimate of dowry by 20.5 percent, but the effect remains significant.  That 
dowry influences a wife’s decision-making authority and that it does so independently of 
household wealth lend further credence to the notion that dowry affects a wife’s intrahousehold 
bargaining position.  Neither brideprice nor wealth has a significant effect on a wife’s decision-
making authority.  Finally, the point estimate for instrumented dowry is larger than that of un-
instrumented dowry, again suggesting that dowry correlates with negative characteristics of the 
groom and/or his family, i.e., that the OLS estimates are biased downward.  
  All of these results show a consistently negative (if insignificant) effect of brideprice on a 
wife’s welfare.  If brideprice only acts as a price mechanism, then it is unclear why it should 
have any impact on marital outcomes once dowry is controlled for.  However, it appears that 
families who pay higher brideprices may compensate by extracting more labor or negotiating 
lower consumption for brides.  In the cooperative Nash bargaining context, it is possible that this 
outcome is achieved by making unmeasured, private transfers to sons in order to raise their 
marital threat points, but this hypothesis cannot be confirmed with these data. 
7. Conclusion 
  Theory predicts that individual control of resources affects one’s bargaining position 
within marriage and thus one’s allocation of marital output.  While the concept of bargaining 
position is straightforward, measuring it for empirical investigation has proven difficult.  Labor 
income, nonlabor income, and extrahousehold environmental parameters each may suffer from 
simultaneity bias in the absence of strong identifying assumptions.  An interesting alternative 
indicator of bargaining position is individual endowments brought to the marriage, such as 
dowry.  However, previous studies focusing on the impact of these transfers on welfare within 
marriage have not sufficiently controlled for omitted variable bias.   23
  In the Chinese context, brideprice serves as a market clearing price by compensating a 
woman’s family for human capital investments made during the woman’s childhood (Croll, 
1981), for the loss of rights over her (Goody, 1973), and for the loss of her future contribution to 
household income (Parish and Whyte, 1978; Min and Eades, 1995; Zhang, 2000).  Dowry, on the 
other hand, is an intergenerational transfer that serves primarily as a pre-mortem bequest to a 
daughter (Parish and Whyte, 1978; Croll, 1981).  Because the wife controls dowry and because 
she retains this authority even in the event of divorce (a realistic option in rural China), dowry 
may serve as a proxy for a woman’s bargaining position.  
This paper makes use of new data from rural China to investigate the impact of dowry on 
several measures of intrahousehold allocation in a cooperative Nash bargaining framework.  To 
control for the potential endogeneity of marital payments, I use two types of instruments that 
reflect household savings available for marital payments.  The first is regional grain shocks in the 
year preceding marriage.  Agriculture shocks are likely to have large effects on savings in rural 
communities in which credit markets are incomplete and in which the population consists almost 
entirely of farmers, and thus on the ability of households to pay dowry or brideprice.  The second 
instrument is the sibling sex composition of the bride and groom.  Because dowry payments are 
generally smaller than brideprice payments in the surveyed areas, the marriage of daughters 
represents net household income while that of sons represents net household expenditures.  
Hence, the sex composition of children impacts the resources available to the family for making 
marital payments.  I control for unobservable correlates of sibling sex composition by including 
family characteristics as additional regressors.  All estimates also include marriage cohort 
dummies to control for generational norms in household allocation.  Furthermore, the empirical 
specifications are estimated with village fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
This identification strategy represents a significant improvement over previous studies in 
controlling effectively for potential bias from omitted variables and simultaneity.   
  I find that dowry has a positive and robust impact on the wife’s leisure time, on the 
amount of time that husbands allocate to performing household chores each week, and on the 
probability that the wife self-identifies as being satisfied with her life.  To better discern between 
wealth effects and bargaining effects associated with dowry, I also analyze the effect of dowry 
on spending on women’s goods as a share of the total household expenditures, on the wife’s 
share of the couple’s total leisure time, and on the husband’s share of the couple’s time allocated   24
to performing household chores.  Dowry has a positive and significant effect on each of these 
outcomes, and changes in the distribution of goods and time within the household are difficult to 
explain if dowry only has a wealth effect.  Finally, I investigate the effect of dowry on a wife’s 
decision-making authority when the husband and wife disagree about matters of importance to 
the household.  Dowry has a positive and significant effect, again suggesting that dowry affects 
the wife’s bargaining position.   
  These results provide strong empirical support for the theoretical literature linking control 
of resources to intrahousehold allocation decisions, and thus to the collective models of the 
household.  Based on the robustness of these findings, it is plausible that dowry serves as a 
vehicle for altruistic parents to improve their daughter’s marital welfare in addition to being a 
pre-mortem inheritance.  Better understanding the motivation for giving dowry and the 
determinants of dowry size remain priorities for further research. 
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Figure 1A. Mean Value of Marital Transactions (Sichuan and Guizhou) 
Marital Transactions Over Time in Sichuan Province
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Marital Transactions Over Time in Guizhou Province
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Figure 1B. Mean Value of Marital Transactions (Gansu and Shaanxi) 
Marital Transactions Over Time in Shaanxi Province
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Marital Transactions Over Time in Gansu Province
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Table 1A: Determinants of Dowry (OLS) 
 
Variable  Unit  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
grain shock 1 year before marriage  kg/person  1.628***  1.715***  1.703***  1.709*** 
    (2.66) (2.78) (2.79) (2.81) 
sex composition of wife’s sibs   difference  24.442***       
   (2.70)       
sex composition of husband’s sibs   difference  8.328       
   (1.10)       
sex comp of wife’s older sibs   difference    2.964     
     (0.27)    
sex comp of husband’s older sibs   difference    18.421*    15.494 
     (1.77)   (1.51) 
sex comp of wife’s younger sibs   difference      37.437***  35.872*** 
       (3.09)  (2.96) 
sex comp of husband’s younger sibs   difference      -0.373   
       (0.04)   
age difference  years  -7.032  -7.983*  -7.649*  -7.378 
    (1.54) (1.75) (1.67) (1.63) 
education difference  grades  -3.905 -3.919 -2.833 -3.408 
    (1.00) (1.00) (0.73) (0.88) 
children  in  home  #  32.150** 33.221** 31.656** 30.797** 
    (2.23) (2.29) (2.20) (2.15) 
other adults in home  #  -2.167  -0.564  -1.260  -2.534 
    (0.13) (0.03) (0.07) (0.15) 
wife's parents' ed  years  5.748  17.450*  15.512  15.384 
    (0.57) (1.79) (1.41) (1.41) 
husband's parents' ed  years  17.238  19.647*  4.327  4.566 
    (1.58) (1.90) (0.43) (0.45) 
wife's total siblings  #  0.752  -0.944  2.045  0.886 
    (0.09) (0.11) (0.24) (0.10) 
husband's total siblings  #  2.945  2.933  3.109  3.145 
    (0.34) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) 
Constant    240.315*** 235.443*** 241.273*** 247.216*** 
    (3.66) (3.55) (3.68) (3.78) 
Village  FE    yes yes yes yes 
County  FE        
Observations    451 451 451 451 
R-squared    0.296 0.286 0.297 0.301 
F(3, 392) instruments jointly equal 0    5.59  3.58  5.76  6.56 
Prob > F    0.0009  0.014  0.0007  0.0002 
Village fixed effects implemented 
County * Marriage Cohort interactions included 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 1B: Determinants of Brideprice (OLS) 
 
Variable  Unit  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
grain shock 1 year before marriage  kg/person  1.883  2.118  2.115  2.042 
    (1.43) (1.63) (1.60) (1.57) 
sex composition of wife’s sibs   difference  33.233*       
   (1.70)       
sex composition of husband’s sibs   difference  22.322       
   (1.37)       
sex comp of wife’s older sibs   difference    25.663     
     (1.12)    
sex comp of husband’s older sibs   difference    85.894***    81.598*** 
     (3.92)   (3.74) 
sex comp of wife’s younger sibs   difference      25.548  16.223 
       (0.98)  (0.63) 
sex comp of husband’s younger sibs   difference      -36.074*   
       (1.67)   
age difference  years  -8.568  -9.220  -13.218  -9.542 
    (0.87) (0.96) (1.34) (0.99) 
education difference  grades  12.569  10.377  14.454*  11.215 
    (1.50) (1.25) (1.73) (1.35) 
children in home  #  58.892*  58.406*  62.584**  56.734* 
    (1.90) (1.91) (2.01) (1.85) 
other adults in home  #  -8.927  -10.471  0.326  -10.293 
    (0.24) (0.29) (0.01) (0.29) 
wife's parents' ed  years  -16.087  -14.528  -6.331  -16.382 
    (0.74) (0.63) (0.71) (0.70) 
husband's parents' ed  years  -16.407  0.043  -16.868  -6.433 
    (0.70) (0.00) (0.29) (0.30) 
wife's total siblings  #  5.852  -1.690  10.366  2.097 
    (0.32) (0.09) (0.57) (0.12) 
husband's total siblings  #  4.717  4.377  6.263  5.396 
    (0.25) (0.24) (0.33) (0.29) 
Constant    550.746*** 574.593*** 527.010*** 565.251*** 
    (3.90) (4.11) (3.72) (4.04) 
Village  FE    yes yes yes yes 
County  FE        
Observations    451 451 451 451 
R-squared    0.426 0.441 0.424 0.440 
F(3, 392) instruments jointly equal 0    2.51  6.05  2.00  5.74 
Prob > F    0.0583  0.0005  0.1141  0.0007 
Village fixed effects implemented 
County * Marriage Cohort interactions included 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   33
Table 2. Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Unit  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
         
wife's leisure (non-work) 
time 
hours  per  day  19.02 2.57  11.51 24 
wife's share of couple’s 
total leisure (non-work) 
time 
% of couple's total leisure time  48.00%  3.82%  33.02%  58.34% 
husband's time allocated to 
chores 
hours per week  0.74  1.41  0  15 
husband's share of couple’s 
time allocated to chores  
% of couple's total time devoted to chores  17.73%  27.13%  0%  100% 
share of household 
spending accruing to 
women's goods 
% of annual household spending   0.19%  0.38%  0%  2.01% 
wife's satisfaction  1 = completely unsatisfied, 2 = somewhat 
unsatisfied, 3 = somewhat satisfied, 4 = 
completely satisfied 
2.60 0.57  1  4 
wife's decision-making 
authority  
0 = husband makes decisions, 0.5 = both 
make decisions, 1=wife makes decisions 
0.35   0.43   0  1 
         
dowry  yuan, 1985 real value  247.12  313.79  0  2044 
brideprice  yuan, 1985 real value  537.89  748.19  0  7493 
wealth  value of durables, 1985 real yuan  653.90  806.29  0  7297 
length of marriage  years  19.38  10.80  1  51 
husband's age  years  43.18  10.79  23  74 
wife's age  years  40.45  10.38  21  70 
age difference  husband's age - wife's age  2.73  3.24  -7  16 
husband's education  grades completed  6.14  3.80  0  16 
wife's education  grades completed  2.90  3.47  0  14 
education difference  husband's ed - wife's ed  3.24  3.75  -12  12 
children in home  #  1.43  1.14  0  5 
other adults in home  #  0.64  0.91  0  4 
wife's parents' education  total years  2.38  4.01  0  24 
husband's parents' ed  total years  2.36  3.70  0  24 
wife's total siblings  #  3.84  1.74  0  11 
husband's total siblings  #  3.70  1.74  0  8 
Sichuan province  dummy  0.24  0.43     
Guizhou province  dummy  0.30  0.46     
Shaanxi province  dummy  0.23  0.42     
Gansu  province dummy  0.23  0.42       
         
grain shock 1 year before 
marriage 
deviation from time trend, in kg/person  -1.65  27.86  -90.82  64.01 
wife's sibling sex 
composition 
difference in #s of younger sisters and 
brothers 
-0.21 1.38  -4  4 
husband's sibling sex 
composition 
difference in #s of older sisters and brothers  0.11  1.41  -6  6 
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Table 3. Non-Instrumented Estimates (OLS and Probit)  
     
1: wife's leisure (non-work) time (OLS) 
2: husband's time allocated to chores (OLS) 
3: share of household spending accruing to women's goods (OLS) 
4: wife’s satisfaction (probit) 
5: wife's decision-making authority (ordered probit) 
 
Variable Unit  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
          
dowry 100 
yuan 
0.10376**  -0.01172  0.00024*** 0.08851*** 0.02234 
    (2.24)  (0.43) (3.46) (5.59) (1.30) 
brideprice 100 
yuan 
-0.02539 -0.01144  -0.00007**  0.00263 0.01352 
    (1.16)  (0.90) (2.32) (0.43) (1.50) 
age  difference  years  -0.08083**  0.02182  -0.00000 -0.00227 0.00056 
    (2.11)  (0.98) (0.05) (0.23) (0.03) 
education difference  grades  -0.03858  0.01324  -0.00006  -0.01546*  0.00368 
    (1.18)  (0.69) (1.32) (1.70) (0.24) 
children in home  #  0.07411  0.02665  -0.00025  0.01530  -0.03103 
    (0.61)  (0.38) (1.44) (0.45) (0.38) 
other adults in home  #  0.14579  -0.11921  0.00048**  0.09041***  0.11499 
    (1.03)  (1.44) (2.29) (2.63) (1.53) 
wife's parents' ed  years  0.06429  0.11730***  0.00003  -0.01893  0.02796 
    (0.83)  (2.61) (0.26) (1.10) (1.00) 
husband's parents' 
ed 
years 0.02941  0.02935 0.00011 0.01853 0.05837** 
    (0.32)  (0.55) (0.85) (0.89) (2.14) 
wife's total siblings  #  0.00742  0.09580**  -0.00002  -0.00952  0.01449 
    (0.10)  (2.31) (0.17) (0.46) (0.49) 
husband's total sibs  #  -0.06223  0.01293  -0.00007  0.01569  0.07524** 
    (0.85)  (0.30) (0.62) (0.82) (2.08) 
Constant   20.31254***  0.28503  0.00126    
    (15.49) (0.37) (0.65)    
Village FE    yes  yes  yes     
County FE          yes  yes 
Observations   451  451 451 290 284 
R-squared   0.255  0.155  0.283     
County * Marriage Cohort interactions included  
Absolute value of robust t or z statistics in parentheses 
Errors are assumed to be clustered by village when county fixed effects are implemented     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
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Table 4. Wife's Time Allocation (IV OLS) 
 
1: wife's daily leisure (non-work) time   
2: wife's share of couple's total daily leisure (non-work) time  
 
Variable Unit  (1)  (2) 
      
dowry 100  yuan  0.74092**  0.00772* 
   (2.22)  (1.75) 
brideprice 100  yuan  -0.27232  -0.00208 
   (1.63)  (0.94) 
age difference  years  -0.05477  -0.00025 
   (1.06)  (0.36) 
education difference  grades  0.01607  0.00032 
   (0.31)  (0.47) 
children in home  #  -0.00887  -0.00051 
   (0.05)  (0.21) 
other adults in home  #  0.13337  -0.00063 
   (0.75)  (0.27) 
wife's parents' ed  years  -0.04456  -0.00049 
   (0.40)  (0.33) 
husband's parents' ed  years  -0.14026  -0.00205 
   (0.97)  (1.07) 
wife's total siblings  #  0.01996  -0.00026 
   (0.22)  (0.22) 
husband's total siblings  #  -0.07392  -0.00070 
   (0.80)  (0.58) 
Constant   17.60930***  0.44572*** 
   (9.13)  (17.44) 
Village FE    yes  yes 
County FE       
Observations   451  451 
County * Marriage Cohort interactions included  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5. Husband's Time Allocation (IV OLS)   
 
1: husband's weekly time allocated to chores 
2: husband’s share of couple's total weekly time allocated to chores 
  
Variable Unit  (1)  (2) 
      
dowry 100  yuan  0.47691**  0.11173** 
   (2.27)  (2.41) 
brideprice 100  yuan  -0.11662  -0.02934 
   (1.11)  (1.27) 
age difference  years  0.05154  0.01309* 
   (1.58)  (1.82) 
education difference  grades  0.04329  0.01053 
   (1.33)  (1.47) 
children in home  #  -0.09568  -0.02296 
   (0.85)  (0.92) 
other adults in home  #  -0.12680  -0.01503 
   (1.13)  (0.61) 
wife's parents' ed  years  0.03348  -0.01909 
   (0.48)  (1.23) 
husband's parents' ed  years  -0.09314  -0.02024 
   (1.03)  (1.01) 
wife's total siblings  #  0.09908*  0.01403 
   (1.75)  (1.13) 
husband's total siblings  #  -0.00180  -0.01509 
   (0.03)  (1.18) 
Constant   -1.46965  -0.27327 
   (1.21)  (1.02) 
Village FE    yes  yes 
County FE       
Observations   451  451 
County * Marriage Cohort interactions included 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
   37
Table 6. Share of Household Spending Accruing to Women's Goods (IV OLS) 
   
Variable Unit  (1)  (2) 
      
dowry 100  yuan  0.00081*  0.00074* 
   (1.85)  (1.67) 
brideprice 100  yuan  -0.00035  -0.00034 
   (1.60)  (1.56) 
age difference  years  0.00001  0.00003 
   (0.21)  (0.38) 
education difference  grades -0.00001  -0.00000 
   (0.10)  (0.05) 
children in home  #  -0.00029  -0.00028 
   (1.24)  (1.21) 
other adults in home  #  0.00046**  0.00035 
   (1.98)  (0.89) 
wife's parents' ed  years  -0.00007  -0.00009 
   (0.47)  (0.55) 
husband's parents' ed  years  -0.00004  -0.00007 
   (0.23)  (0.33) 
wife's total siblings  #  -0.00000  -0.00001 
   (0.02)  (0.07) 
husband's total siblings  #  -0.00007  -0.00009 
   (0.61)  (0.71) 
household wealth  100 yuan    0.00002 
     (0.38) 
Constant   -0.00154  -0.00175 
   (0.61)  (0.66) 
Village FE    yes  yes 
County FE       
Observations   451  451 
County * Marriage Cohort interactions included  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7. Wife's Satisfaction (IV Probit) 
   
Variable Unit  (1)  (2) 
      
dowry 100  yuan  0.16087**  0.12371* 
   (2.23)  (1.73) 
brideprice 100  yuan  0.00823  0.01649 
   (0.26)  (0.48) 
age difference  years  0.00947  0.00896 
   (0.69)  (0.66) 
education difference  grades -0.01546 -0.01420 
   (1.44)  (1.25) 
children in home  #  -0.02719  -0.01917 
   (0.53)  (0.39) 
other adults in home  #  0.09032**  0.07068 
   (2.23)  (1.29) 
wife's parents' ed  years  -0.03548  -0.03355 
   (1.35)  (1.29) 
husband's parents' ed  years  -0.00195  0.00006 
   (0.06)  (0.00) 
wife's total siblings  #  -0.00946  -0.01621 
   (0.43)  (0.66) 
husband's total siblings  #  0.01521  0.01568 
   (0.70)  (0.71) 
household wealth, yuan  100 yuan    0.00531 
     (0.58) 
Village FE       
County FE    yes  yes 
Observations   290  290 
Marginal effects shown 
County * Marriage Cohort interactions included 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8. Wife's Decision-Making Authority (IV Ordered Probit and IV Probit) 
 
1 & 2: IV Ordered Probit Estimation  
3 & 4: IV Probit Estimation  
 
Variable  Unit (1) (2) (3) (4) 
dowry 100  yuan  0.40227***  0.41359***  0.15732**  0.12514* 
    (2.55) (2.54) (2.03) (1.66) 
brideprice 100  yuan  -0.09291  -0.09850  -0.03656  -0.02666 
    (0.96) (0.99) (0.94) (0.69) 
age  difference  years 0.02879 0.02466 0.01023 0.01078 
    (1.22) (0.95) (0.63) (0.70) 
education  difference  grades  0.02467 0.02416 0.00930 0.01233 
    (1.56) (1.51) (0.73) (0.92) 
children in home  #  -0.11180  -0.10539  -0.05196  -0.04510 
    (1.23) (1.12) (0.92) (0.85) 
other adults in home  #  0.07585  0.10048  0.05779  0.02890 
    (1.02) (0.77) (1.22) (0.44) 
wife's parents' ed  years  -0.03288  -0.02988  -0.01948  -0.02157 
    (0.82) (0.73) (0.73) (0.83) 
husband's parents' ed  years  -0.04052  -0.03417  -0.04121  -0.04517 
    (1.14) (0.75) (1.25) (1.37) 
wife's total siblings  #  0.02638  0.02647  0.01525  0.00639 
    (0.81) (0.81) (0.59) (0.23) 
husband's total siblings  #  0.05520  0.05940  0.02624  0.02396 
    (1.39) (1.27) (1.04) (0.99) 
wealth  100  yuan   0.00465   0.00645 
     (0.26)   (0.61) 
Village  FE       
County  FE   yes yes yes yes 
Observations    293 293 284 284 
Marginal effects shown 
County * Marriage Cohort interactions included 
Absolute value of robust z statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are not corrected for IV ordered probit 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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